Friday’s three way mini-summit in Beirut hosted by Lebanese President Michel Sleiman and attended by King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria (they may even travel together on the same plane) and Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani I (who brokered the 2008 Doha Agreement), is many things to many people.
On the face of it, it is a united Arab front (Egypt appears to have already given its blessing) against Hezbollah and its Iranian backers. Much has changed since the remarkable dinner in Damascus, hosted by Assad, at which the guests of honor were Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, leaving no one in any doubt who had first dibs for seats at the region’s top table.
But that was then, and the Middle East’s tectonic plates have since shifted. Iran is increasingly isolated and heading for more censure from the UN, and Turkey has moved closer to the action, attracting the attentions of both Saudi Arabia and Syria. Hezbollah, in the meantime, is feeling the heat. It has come under scrutiny from the international justice system just as it might be required to fight a war with its archenemy Israel, either on behalf of Iran or in response to a preemptive strike by Tel Aviv.
The fears (not to mention the threats) of Hezbollah-inspired civil violence such as we witnessed on May 7, 2008, or even a fully-fledged coup d’état to prevent indictments by the Special Tribunal, have pushed King Abdullah and President Assad to formally solemnize the understanding reached at the end of 2009 that appeared to underwrite the government of Saad Hariri.
It is a move that, on the face of it, we should welcome. Hezbollah has discarded all pretence of being a mature partner in government by its childish posturing and its cynical attempts to undermine state and international institutions by spreading fear and suspicion among its constituents and the general population. A party that is predicated on conflict and intolerance – “anyone who supports the tribunal is an Israeli agent” – must be brought to heel, and Nasrallah will be worried by the fact that Assad will not see him, at least not officially, when he comes to town.
This is all very well. But let us consider the calculations. Saudi Arabia wants to secure its man in Beirut and at the same time, if not draw Damascus out of Iran’s orbit, at least give it a glimpse of what the friendship of Riyadh can mean to a country in need of economic help. Much has been said, most recently on this site, on the rock-solid nature of Syria’s relationship with Iran and how one must not be fooled by what is in all likelihood a temporary glitch. But Syria is in full-on survival mode and feathering its nest for a future that will either see Iran in isolation, at war or under new management.
Where does this leave Lebanon? While we welcome the support from the Arab community, we hope that Lebanon will not once again be the victim of a regional deal. Syria has done nothing in the last five years to show that it has changed its attitude toward Lebanon, and by that we mean that it still sees the country as a lost province whose rightful place is within the larger Syrian fold.
When the original deal over Lebanon was brokered at the end of 2009, Syria negotiated one foot in Lebanon’s door by ensuring that the so-called national-unity government was in reality one in which Damascus had a stake. There is nothing to suggest that Syria would never send its tanks rolling over the border once again, perhaps even as an excuse to restore stability after a war (possibly one in which it had a hand in starting). There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Syria still wants Hezbollah to treat it, and not Iran, as its main patron and may be maneuvering precisely to achieve this end.
So yes, Hezbollah may have overplayed its hand, and yes there appears to be Arab cover for Lebanon, but at what price?
